

# AMNA JAVED

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## FIELDS OF EXPERTISE

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Development Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Labor Economics, Gender Economics

## EDUCATION

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**University of Oregon** *2017-Present*

Ph.D in Economics

*Committee: Alfredo Burlando (chair), Shankha Chakraborty, Jiabin Wu (Economics); Lamia Karim (Anthropology)*

**University of Oregon** *2016-2017*

M.A. in Economics

**Lahore University of Management Sciences** *2011-2015*

B.Sc. Honors in Economics (with Distinction)

## WORKING PAPERS

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*“Early Marriage and Social Norms: Evidence from India’s Unenforced Child Marriage Ban”*  
(Job Market Paper)

*“In the Name of Honor? Evaluating the Impact of Weather Variability on ‘Honor’ Killings in Pakistan”*

*“Competition in Sibling Fertility? An Analysis of South Asian Joint Households”*

## RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

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*“Does Side Selling Respond to Interlinked Agricultural Credit?”* (with Alfredo Burlando)

*“Matching in an Arranged Marriage Market: An Empirical Analysis Using Novel Data from Pakistan”*

## WORK EXPERIENCE

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Consultant, World Bank 2019, Current

Research Assistant, Lahore University of Management Sciences 2015-2016

Intern, Justice Project Pakistan 2013

Intern, Gallup Pakistan 2012

## FIELD EXPERIENCE

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Marriage Bureau data collection, Pakistan 2018

Household survey collection, Pakistan 2013

## **AWARDS, GRANTS & HONORS**

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Graduate Teaching Award, University of Oregon	2020
Kleinsorge Economics Fellowship Award, Department of Economics	2020
Center for the Study of Women in Society, Research Grant	2019
Kleinsorge Economics Fellowship Award, Department of Economics	2016-2017
Distinctive Scholar Award, University of Oregon	2016-2017

## **TEACHING**

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### **Independent Instructor**

EC 320: Introduction to Econometrics	Winter 2020, Fall 2020 (remote)
EC 490: Growth and Development Economics	Fall 2019
EC 333: Environmental and Natural Resources	Winter 2019
EC 435: Natural Resource Economics	Summer 2018

### **Teaching Assistant**

EC 524: Econometrics (graduate level)	Spring 2018
EC 421: Introduction to Econometrics	Fall 2017, Spring 2018
EC 321: Introduction to Econometrics	Winter 2018
EC 201: Introduction to Microeconomics	Spring 2019

## **CONFERENCES & PRESENTATIONS**

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Delhi Winter School, Delhi School of Economics	2020
Western Economic Association International	2020
Center for the Study of Women in Society	2020
Development Workshop, Oregon State University	2020
Economics Club, University of Oregon	2019, 2020
Microeconomics Workshop, University of Oregon	2019, 2020
Poverty Lab, World Bank	2019
Development Workshop, University of Oregon	2018, 2019
South Asian Economics Students Meets, World Bank	2014

## **PROFESSIONAL SERVICE**

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Co-President Women in Economics, University of Oregon	2019-2020
President, Graduate Employee Guild, Department of Economics	2018-2019

## **TECHNICAL SKILLS**

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R, Stata, LaTeX, Google Earth Engine, Python, Qualtrics, MS Office

## **LANGUAGE SKILLS**

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English, Urdu, Punjabi (basic), Hindi (speaking/listening)

## REFERENCES

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### **Alfredo Burlando**

Associate Professor, Economics  
University of Oregon  
Email: burlando@uoregon.edu

### **Jiabin Wu**

Associate Professor, Economics  
University of Oregon  
Email: jwu5@uoregon.edu

### **Shankha Chakraborty**

Professor, Economics  
University of Oregon  
Email: shankhac@uoregon.edu

## ABSTRACTS

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### *“Early Marriage and Social Norms: Evidence from India’s Unenforced Child Marriage Ban” (Job Market Paper)*

Women who marry early have lower decision-making power, less education, and poorer maternal health outcomes. While many countries have implemented laws to increase the legal age of marriage, the global number of child brides remains high, with India as the largest contributor. I analyze India’s 1978 Child Marriage Restraint Act, which raised the legal age of marriage for women from 15 to 18 years. I exploit geographical variation in early marriage social norms combined with differences across year of birth to define exposure to the law and find that the ban led to a 7.8 percent decrease in the likelihood of marriage before 18, at the average norm intensity. I rule out the role of differential sex ratios, enforcement capacities or political leadership as a mechanism, and instead argue that awareness of the ban combined with a perception of enforcement are driving the results. The research makes a significant contribution to our understanding of policy implementation by highlighting the non-sanctionary role of the law in affecting the behavior of individuals.

### *“In the Name of Honor? Evaluating the Impact of Weather Variability on ‘Honor’ Killings in Pakistan”*

In Pakistan, approximately 700 men and women are killed every year in the name of “honor”. This research aims to improve our understanding of honor based crimes in two stages. First, I systematically compile a unique data set of honor killings using newspaper reports from 11 local and national news sources, covering 89 districts for 41 months. The data suggests approximately 70% of victims of honor based crimes are young women, while 50% of perpetrators are members of the victim’s natal family. I show that reporting is not biased towards incidents with a higher number of deaths, or more ‘gruesome’ crimes. Second, I show that higher than average rainfall shocks reduce production of cotton, a major cash crop, likely negatively affecting income. I exploit rainfall variation, using the Global Precipitation Measurement satellite data, to examine the effect of income shocks on honor killings. Using a fixed effects Poisson model, I find that a one standard deviation increase in the previous month’s rainfall from the local long run average increases reported honor killing incidents in cotton producing districts by 7.3%. Dry shocks have no significant effect. I interpret these results as suggestive evidence that adverse income shocks are an underlying cause of murder of individuals for “honor”.

*“Competition in Sibling Fertility: An Analysis of South Asian Joint Households”*

Approximately 20 percent of households in India have at least one co-residing daughter-in-law. In this research, I examine the hypothesis that the social status of women in joint Indian households is determined by both their husband’s relative age, as well as the gender of their children. Women who marry the elder co-resident son (first rank) have greater decision making power and mobility as a result of being the elder daughter-in-law, compared to women who marry the younger co-resident son (second rank). Thus, first ranking women have less pressure to bear a son to improve their autonomy. Women who marry the younger co-residing son cannot improve their autonomy using rank, and instead have a greater incentive to birth a son. Using the Demographic and Health Survey for India, I provide preliminary evidence that first ranking women increase birth spacing by a magnitude of 16 percent on average upon the entrance of the second rank, even if they have not already borne sons. This delay in births is not explained by a change in early childhood investments. Furthermore, second ranking women reduce their marriage-to-first birth interval by approximately 4.7 percent if the first ranking woman in the household already has a son. Taken together, the results provide suggestive evidence for fertility rivalry within a household as a means to improve social status.